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EFFICIENT TIME BARS: A NEW RATIONALE
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF STATUTES OF




This paper proposes a novel normative economic explanation for statutes of lim-
itations for criminal offenses. Because potential criminals tend to discount the future
at higher rates than society, punishing crimes long after they are committed will be
inefficient. Punishments after a long lag have only a nominal deterrent effect, while
they may cost society substantial sums. The model presented in the paper derives
the optimal statute of limitations for a crime by modifying the standard model of
public enforcement of law to consider lags between crime and punishment. In ad-
dition, numerical simulations of the model suggest that some U.S. statutes of limi-
tations are generally consistent with optimal limitations (probably serendipitously).
Finally, the paper employs the model to critique several tenets of the law concerning
statutes of limitations.
I. INTRODUCTION
SrATUTES of limitations for criminal offenses have been a feature of U.S.
criminal law since the early days of the Republic.' Interestingly, however,
the rationale for statutes of limitations in criminal law is subject to contro-
versy. (A statute of limitations is defined as a "legislative act restricting the
time within which legal proceedings may be brought.")2 Most legal scholars
posit that criminal statutes of limitations are chosen to balance society's need
to punish a criminal with some countervailing factor. For some, the primary
countervailing factor is a "criminal's right to repose.,,3 Others emphasize that
* I would like to thank Debopam Bhattacharya, Chang-Tai Hsieh, Gad Levanon, Aprajit
Mahajan, Steven Shavell, Dave Skeie, Alessandro Tarozzi, Jim Vere, Stephanie Wexler, an
anonymous referee, and the participants in Princeton University's Development Lunch Seminar
for their helpful comments and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Anne Case for her
invaluable help and guidance. All errors are my own.
I Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1177
(1950).
2 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. "statutes of limitations" (2000).
3 J. Anthony Chavez, Statutes of Limitations and the Right to a Fair Trial: When Is a Crime
Complete? 10 Crim. Just. 2, 2 (1995) (the right of repose suggests that an individual should
not have to live with the uncertainty of prosecution, and thus at the mercy of prosecutors, ad
infinitum); See also United States v. Toussie, 397 U.S. II 2, 1I5 (1970).
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the quality of evidence deteriorates with time and assert that fairness requires
timely prosecution.4 Most legal scholars subscribe to some combination of
these two standards.
While these explanations have the advantage of echoing the standard ra-
tionales for statutes of limitations in civil law, they have been the subject of
some recent controversy.5 Many legal reformers of the 1970s and 1980s
viewed statutes of limitations as a "formalistic impediment to full justice.,,6
These opinions were reflected in a series of statutes and decisions that weak-
ened the scope and applicability of time bars (as statutes of limitations are
frequently called). Some lawyers have decried this process.7 They note that
the primary justifications for criminal statutes of limitations are still germane
and, consequently, condemn the recent trend.
Criminal statutes of limitations are also far from universal. England, for
example, has no general statute of limitations applicable to criminal actions.s
In addition, there is considerable variation in statutes of limitations for iden-
tical crimes across jurisdictions within the United States. For instance, statutes
of limitations for low-level felonies range from 2 years in Kansas to no limit
in several states, such as South Carolina, Wyoming, and Kentucky.9 These
variations suggest that no existing rationale for criminal statutes of limitations
is universally acceptable.
This paper posits a novel normative economic explanation for time bars
on prosecution. According to the standard theory of public enforcement of
law, expenditures on criminal justice are justified only if their marginal
cost is lower than the marginal benefit of the expenditures in terms of fewer
crimes. If criminals discount the future at a higher rate than society (a
commonly accepted view within criminology) and punishing crimes is
costly for society, then, at times well after the commission of a crime,
punishing a crime is inefficient from a deterrence perspective. Suppose, for
example, that potential criminals care nothing for events and expenditures
that take place more than 5 years from the present, while society values
expenditures 5 years hence at some finite amount. This implies that pun-
ishment for a crime more than 5 years after its commission is inefficient
4 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971); and Chavez, supra note 3.
5 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 587 (4th ed. 1992).
6 Walter Olson, Stale Claims: How Long Should the Law Nurse Old Grievances? Reason
Mag., November 2000, at 40.
7 Chavez, supra note 3, at 2-3; and Olson, supra note 6. Both Chavez and Olson cite several
statutes extending various statutes of limitations (such as 18 U.S.c. § 3283 and 18 U.S.c.
§ 3286) as well as cases in which the legal applicability of statutes of limitations was limited,
such as United States v. Brechtel, 997 F. 2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1993); and United States v. Taliaferro,
979 F. 2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1992).
8 See Encyclopedia Britannica, supra note 2; and Note, supra note I, at 1177-78.
9 See Kansas Statutes § 21-3106; and Gary Emsdorff & Elizabeth Loftus, Let Sleeping
Memories Lie? Words of Caution about Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory
Repression, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 129-30 (1993).
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from a deterrence perspective. The punishment has pOSItive costs but
achieves no deterrence. Therefore, society may wish to constrain law en-
forcement officials from punishing crimes inefficiently by imposing a statute
of limitations. JO
As a result, statutes of limitations can be justified for reasons distinct
from notions of a criminal's rights. Moreover, numerical simulations (pre-
sented below) suggest that the length of these optimal statutes of limitations
is consistent with the range of statutes of limitations currently imposed by
U.S. state statutes. This normative explanation is then employed to examine
the desirability of statutes of limitations for monetary fines and to critique
some of the recent case law and statutory developments concerning time
bars for prosecution.
The "discounting" approach developed here is related to some previous
studies of optimal law enforcement. For example, A. Mitchell Polinsky and
Steven Shavell find that differential discounting by criminals versus society
may imply that the optimal criminal sentence is not maximal.!) This result
conflicts with the finding of maximal sentencing that is standard throughout
much of the literature.!2 This paper applies logic similar to Polinsky and
Shavell's to examine statutes of limitations, a topic hitherto unexplored in
the optimal law enforcement literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the model of optimal
statutes of limitations and presents some important comparative statics results.
Section III presents a numerical simulation of the model and compares the
results with existing criminal statutes of limitations. Section IV presents
extensions of the model to other types of statutes of limitations. Section V
discusses the applicability of this theory of statutes of limitations to current
legal doctrine and concludes.
II. A MODEL OF OPTIMAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
A. Setup
The model discussed in this section (and presented in the Appendix) fol-
lows the standard model of optimal public enforcement of law. 13 As in the
10 E-mail correspondence with StevenShavell, Harvard Law School (November 2000). It
must be mentioned, however, that there are many rationales for punishment aside from deter-
rence. Since retribution and incapacitation are also goals of punishment (amongst others),
statutes of limitations longer than the "optimal" value found here may be warranted.
\I A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting oflmprisonment
and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. Legal Stud. I (1999).
12 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement
of Law, 38 J. Econ. Literature 50 (2000).
13 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 12, for an extensive survey of this literature. See also
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J.
Pub. Econ. 89 (1984); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff between
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standard model, a potential criminal will weigh the gains associated with
committing a crime against the crime's expected losses (potential impris-
onment). The model differs from the standard model in that it allows pun-
ishment to occur with a lag after the crime is committed, as opposed to
instantaneously.14 Because punishments occur after a lag and criminals dis-
count the future, the same "nominal" prison term causes different "real"
losses depending on when it is imposed.
An example best illustrates this principle. Suppose (for simplicity) that
there is a 100 percent overall probability that a criminal will get caught for
committing a crime and that when the criminal is caught the instantaneous
disutility of the punishment is $10,000. In the conventional model, the crim-
inal will commit this crime if the gain from the crime is greater than $10,000.
If instead the criminal may (with equal probabilities of .5 in either period
and therefore still a 100 percent overall probability of apprehension) be caught
and punished either today or in 1 year's time and the criminal's discount
rate is 25 percent, however, then the criminal will commit the crime if the
gain is greater than [.5 x 10,000 + .5 x 10,000/(1 + .25)] = $9,000. Be-
cause the punishment imposed after 1 year is discounted, the expected dis-
utility associated with the crime is smaller.
The costs to society of imprisonment are also discounted if there are lags
between crime and punishment. Suppose the criminal of the previous par-
agraph commits the crime and receives a I-year sentence. If prison costs
$20,000 a year (and if the criminal in the previous paragraph commits a
crime and is caught today), then the present discounted value of a I-year
prison sentence imposed today is $20,000 (ignoring discounting within the
year), while the present discounted value of the I-year sentence imposed
with equal probability either today or in 1 year if society has a 10 percent
discount rate is [.5 x 20,000 + .5 x 20,000/(1 + .1)] = $19,090.
Adding a time dimension to the standard model introduces a new choice
variable, the statute of limitations, to the standard instruments (such as sen-
tence lengths and enforcement levels) considered by the public enforcement
of law literature. A statute of limitations is an upper bound on the permissible
length of the lag between crime and arrest or indictment. Returning to the
example described above (where the probability of capture is .5 today and
.5 in 1 year's time), suppose that the statute of limitations on prosecution is
the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 880 (1979); Dilip Mookherjee &
I. P. L. Png, Monitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law, 82 Am. Econ. Rev.
556 (1992).
14 This paper focuses on the lag between crime and arrest that occurs because it takes time
for enforcement officers to detect and apprehend a criminal. See John DiIulio, Help Wanted:
Economists, Crime and Public Policy, 10 J. Econ. Persp. 3 (1996). This is different from active
flight by criminals, which is better treated as a separate crime. See Ian Wiener, Running
Rampant: The Imposition of Sanctions and the Use of Force against Fleeing Criminal Suspects,
80 Geo. L. J. 2175, 2183-84 (1992).
HeinOnline -- 31 J. Legal Stud.  103 2002
EFFICIENT TIME BARS 103
6 months. In this case, the expected disutility from punishment becomes
.5 x 10,000 + .5 x 0 = $5,000, as criminals that are "caught" after 1 year
cannot be punished owing to the statute of limitations. Similarly, the pun-
ishment costs associated with a crime to society become .5 x 20,000 +
.5 x 0 = $10,000 as society uses imprisonment less because criminals
caught after the statute of limitations are not punished.
A social planner should choose the statute of limitations exactly as she
chooses the other instruments of public enforcement of law-with the goal of
maximizing social welfare. In the model presented in the Appendix, society
can choose the statute of limitations but takes the probability of apprehension
and the length of the prison sentence as given. The statute oflimitations should
be chosen to minimize present discounted social costs, which include the harm
associated with crimes and the present discounted cost of imprisonment.
The model makes two basic assumptions. The first assumption is that the
crime should not have a statute of limitations of zero. This implies that the
crime is one worth punishing.
The model's key assumption is that 0 > 050C' In words, this assumption
states that potential criminals discount the future at a faster rate (0) than
society (05OC). Casual observation supports this assertion. While the nation
debates the future of the Social Security system through the 2030s, many
individuals (and particularly those in areas with high crime rates) patronize
pawn shops charging interest rates of up to 100 percent. 15
The assumption that 0 > 050C also receives support from a number of well-
known conclusions by criminologists. As one leading expert on crime has put
it, many criminals are "radically present-oriented"; that is, they discount the
future more heavily than the average person. 16 Similarly, in a well-known study,
James Wilson and Allan Abrahamse reject a number of popular interpretations
of the motivations of career criminals and instead conclude that criminals are
"temperamentally disposed to overvalue the benefits ofcrime and to undervalue
its costs" because they are "inordinately impulsive or present-oriented.,,'7 Two
economists have interpreted this result to mean that criminals "discount pun-
ishments for ... futurity more higWy than other people."18 In total, the as-
15 See John Caskey, Pawnbroking in America: The Economics of a Forgotten Credit Market,
23 J. Money, Credit & Banking 85 (1991); and Roger Swagler, John Burton, & Joan Lewis,
The Alternative Financial Sector: An Overview, 7 Advancing the Consumer Interest 7 (1995).
16 See DiIulio, supra note 14, at 16-17. There may be complex psychological and sociological
explanations for why criminals seem to be so consistently "present-oriented." For a more in-
depth look at the issue, see Mark Fleisher, Beggars and Thieves (1995); and James Q. Wilson
& Richard Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (1985).
17 See James Q. Wilson & Allan Abrahamse, Does Crime Pay? 9 Just. Q. 359 (1992). See
also Wilson & Herrnstein, supra note 16, which describes criminals as "myopic."
15 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 465 (3d ed. 2000).
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sumption that 0 > osoc seems to be a well-founded one. 19
Below, the model described here is employed to derive several implications
regarding statutes of limitations.
B. Results and Implications of the Model
The model's chief implication is proposition 1:
PROPOSITION 1. All crimes that are punished should have a finite statute
of limitations.
Proof For formal proof, see the Appendix.
As mentioned above, the statute of limitations should be chosen by the
same criterion used to choose any other tool of law enforcement-to minimize
social costs. Raising the statute of limitations has both marginal benefits and
marginal costs. The marginal benefit comes in the form of increased deter-
rence. If the statute of limitations is lengthened, the expected punishment
goes Up.20 As a result, the gain required to make committing a crime worth-
while also goes up. Any criminal who formerly barely preferred to commit
the crime is now deterred, and fewer crimes are committed. Added deterrence
benefits society in two ways. With a reduction in crime, there is less direct
harm associated with crime. In addition, a reduction in crime implies lower
imprisonment expenditures as fewer individuals are sent to prison.
Lengthening the statute of limitations also has marginal costs, however.
With a longer statute of limitations, more of the crimes that do occur will
be punished. Since punishment is costly (prison terms cost money, and there
is a deadweight loss from individuals languishing in jail), a longer statute
of limitations implies higher criminal justice expenditures. To attain the social
optimum, society should choose the statute of limitations at the point where
the marginal benefit of raising the statute of limitations is equal to the mar-
ginal cost of that rise.
Because of the assumption that 0 > 0soc' moreover, there invariably comes
a point at which the costs (in the form of higher criminal justice expenditures)
of raising the statute of limitations will outweigh the benefits of the increase
(as more crimes are deterred). First, note that (by assumption) if the crime
is worth punishing, then the statute of limitations should not be zero. This
implies that there is some range (from zero outward) in which the marginal
benefits of raising the statute of limitations are higher than the marginal costs.
As the statute of limitations lengthens, both the marginal benefit and the
marginal cost of raising the statute of limitations by a given amount tend to
19 If criminals discount the future hyperbolically rather than exponentially (but still at high
rates), the implications of discounting for statutes of limitations remain the same.
20 In the example of the previous section, raising the statute of limitations from 6 months
to I year raises the expected punishment from $5,000 to $9,000.
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go down. 2 \ The marginal costs tend to go down because the present discounted
value of the costs of punishing additional crimes as a result of raising the
statute of limitations is getting progressively smaller. (A dollar spent 5 years
from now on imprisonment is worth less than a dollar spent on prison today.)
The marginal benefits of raising the statute of limitations tend to go down
because the deterrent effect of punishing crimes far in the future is very
small as a result of discounting. (A year spent in prison starting 5 years from
now causes much less expected disutility today than a year spent in prison
starting tomorrow and thus achieves less deterrence.)
Because criminals discount the future at a higher rate than society, the
marginal benefits will tend to go down faster than the marginal costs. More-
over, since discounting is an exponential phenomenon, its effects will quickly
dominate all other considerations. At some point, raising the statute of lim-
itations will have essentially no deterrent effect, since discounting will have
"eaten away" all the value of the punishment. This will make the marginal
benefit of a further rise in the statute of limitations approximately (arbitrarily
close to) zero. At this point, of course, the costs of raising the statute of
limitations will also be much smaller because of discounting.22 Since crim-
inals discount the future more heavily than society, however, discounting
will erode the deterrence effects of longer statutes of limitations more quickly
than it will erode the imprisonment cost side of the ledger. As a result, there
is a point where the marginal benefits (from deterrence) of raising the statute
of limitations are no longer greater than the marginal costs. This point is the
optimal statute of limitations.
The model also offers some salient comparative statics results.
PROPOSITION 2A. Crimes that cause more harm should have longer
statutes of limitations for prosecution.
Proof For a formal proof, see the Appendix.
As the harm associated with a crime goes up, the statute of limitations
should become longer, ceteris paribus. When the harm associated with a
crime rises, the marginal benefit of a rise in the statute of limitations (in the
form of increased deterrence) also rises. Deterring a more pernicious crime
has a greater benefit for society than deterring a less pernicious crime. As a
result, if the harm associated with ~ crime rises, so too should the statute of
2\ Because few assumptions have been made about Z(g) and z(g) (see the Appendix for
formal definitions of these terms), the marginal costs and benefits may not go down mono-
tonically with increases in n. In symmetric distributions (z(g» where the critical gain is above
the mean, however, the marginal benefits and marginal costs of raising the statute of limitations
do go down monotonically. With any Z(g), the marginal costs and marginal benefits of raising
the statute of limitations ultimately get arbitrarily close to zero.
22 Note that even with very long (or infinite) statutes of limitations, complete deterrence (no
crimes) is impossible, since there will always be some potential criminals with gains that are
so high as to ensure that they will commit the crime. (In the formal terms of the Appendix,
the distribution of g has no upper limit.) Thus, there will always be some cost to lengthening
the statute of limitations.
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limitations. This general principle is followed by almost all U.S. states. "Low-
level" felonies, such as burglaries, tend to have much shorter statutes of
limitations than crimes such as murder or rape.23
Additional comparative statics results require additional assumptions. For
formal statements of these conditions, as well as proofs, see the Appendix.
These assumptions roughly correspond to requirements that small changes
in the discount rate should not cause a very large change in the number of
potential criminals with gains from crime in the neighborhood of the critical
gain. The conditions are met in any reasonable parameterization of these
results. When these conditions are met, propositions 2B and 2C apply.
PROPOSITION 2B. When criminals discount the future more heavily, the
statute of limitations should be shorter.
As criminals discount the future at a faster rate, the additional deterrence
that results from longer statutes of limitations falls, since criminals care less
about the prospect of the punishment far in the future. Ceteris paribus, this
implies that the statute of limitations should be lowered, since the benefit of
punishing crimes in the future has decreased (a long statute of limitations
will deter few if any crimes) while the cost (additional imprisonment costs)
has stayed the same.
With similarly messy but generally applicable assumptions, the model also
implies the following:
PROPOSITION 2C. As the disutility suffered by criminals from prison
rises, the statute of limitations should become longer.
When the disutility criminals suffer from prison is greater, more criminals
will be deterred by a given increase in the probability of jail. As a result,
the marginal benefit of lengthening the statute of limitations rises (there is
more deterrence and thus more crimes are prevented by a given increase in
the statute of limitations), while the marginal cost remains the same, ceteris
paribus. Thus, the statute of limitations should become longer.
m. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
A. Setup
To provide a more concrete understanding of these results and to obtain
some insight as to their relevance, this section presents a numerical simulation
of the model detailed above. This section will simulate the social welfare
function of the model presented in the Appendix (equation (Al) of the Ap-
pendix), taking as exogenous the values of all parameters except the statute
of limitations.24 This exercise will be performed for three "levels" of felonies.
23 See infra notes 35 and 39.
24 A full understanding of the mechanics of this simulation would require a reading of the
Appendix. Nevertheless, the "gist" of the simulations should be accessible without such a
reading.
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A "low-level" felony (such as a larceny) has an estimated harm (h) to society
of $2,000.25 A "mid-level" felony, such as a robbery or burglary of a home,
has an estimated harm of $10,000.26 Finally, a "high-level" crime (such as
a murder or rape) is proxied as having a harm of $1 million.
Where possible, the simulation employs empirically verified estimates for
parameter values. For the exogenously determined sentence level (t), for
example, the simulation uses the sentencing guidelines (for each type of
crime) published by the Federal Sentencing Commission for the year 1999.
Prison and prosecution costs (a) are estimated at approximately
$30,000-$40,000 per year.27 The disutility (A) that a criminal experiences
from a year in prison is proxied by foregone earnings and is estimated at
approximately $12,000-$15,000 per year.28 In addition, the simulation em-
ploys the rate at which states can borrow (approximately a 3-4 percent real
rate, converted into exponential terms) as an estimate of the social discount
rate (osoe)' For the potential criminal's discount rate (0), the simulation uses
the interest rate charged at check cashing and pawn shops (approximately
35 percent, although the numbers are often far higher), converted into ex-
ponential terms.29 (The simulation also uses more conservative estimates of
the criminal's discount rate, such as 25 percent or 10 percent rates.)
The time distribution of apprehension and punishment (p(s» is assumed
to be an exponential distribution. (This implies that most crimes are punished
soon after they are committed, with the probability of punishment in any
given period declining as the lag after the crime's commission increases.)
The simulation employs a variety of estimates for the exact shape of the
distribution, generally assuming that at least half of all crimes that are ever
punished are caught and punished in less than 1 year. Finally, the probability
of ever being apprehended ('n') is estimated by utilizing the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports 199930 data on crimes cleared by
arrest, along with John DiIulio's31 estimates of the number of criminals ul-
timately sent to prison.
While these estimates all have at least some empirical foundation, it is
impossible to estimate the true distribution of gains from crime in the pop-
25 See Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and
What Might We Do about It? 10 J. Econ. Persp. 25 (1996); and Steven D. Levitt, The Effect
of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation,
111 Q. J. Econ. 319 (1996).
26 See Freeman, supra note 25, at 38.
27 See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 18, at 470; and Freeman, supra note 25, at 39.
28 See Wilson & Abrahamse, supra note 17, at 363-68.
29 See Swagler, Burton, & Lewis, supra note 15, at 23-30; and Caskey, supra note 15.
30 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports
(1999).
31 See Dilulio, supra note 14, at 12.
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ulation (z(g) and Z(g)).32 Instead, the parameters of the distribution are con-
strained so that the simulation produces reasonable numbers of crimes given
the values of the other empirically estimated parameters. For example, in the
case of burglary, Freeman estimates that there were approximately 2 million
criminals of this type (or worse) in the United States in 1992.33 Thus, the
values for the mean and variance of the normal distribution used in the
simulation (combined with the parameters listed above), should yield results
that accord with the estimate of 2 million criminals.
Many different mean and variance combinations fulfill this criterion. To
narrow down the number of possible distributions even further, the distri-
.butional parameters employed in the simulation are required to produce re-
sults that are not unduly sensitive to changes in the other parameters. (In
other words, there should be no "knife-edge" results in these simulations.)
For example, if the true cost of imprisonment is not $30,000 but rather
$40,000, the distributional parameters must be chosen so that the results of
the simulation do not change radically. After imposing these two require-
ments, the "reasonable" range for the mean and the variance becomes much
narrower.34
The results of the simulations are presented in Tables 1,2, and 3. For each
type of crime, several different specifications of parameter values are listed.
The first column of each table presents the value of the social welfare function
(equation (Al)) for different statute-of-limitation lengths when the parameters
are equal to the estimates detailed above (the base case). The remaining
columns in each table present social welfare when the value of one of the
parameters changes from the base case specification (details are provided in
the tables). For example, the second cell in column (1) of Table 1 presents
the value of the social welfare function when the parameters are those detailed
above (the base case) and the statute of limitations has a length of 2 years.
Finally, the maximum value of the social welfare function for the given
specification is presented in the final row of each column.
The values of the social welfare function (equation (AI)) are negative
because there are social losses (negative social gains) associated with crime.
Because of normalizations and the large number of parameter estimates, only
relative values of social welfare in a given column should be compared-the
32 Note that because the simulation uses the distributions 2(g), the population is effectively
nonnalized to one.
33 See Freeman, supra note 25, at 28.
34 The distributions employed in the simulations imply that the critical gains (gains from the
crime for the criminal on the margin) when the statute of limitations is 5 years are as follows.
For low-level crimes, the critical gain is approximately $250. For mid-level crimes, the critical
gain is approximately $1,000, while for high-level crimes, the critical gain is approximately
$50,000. Note that the critical gains for these crimes are far lower than the harms they cause
($2,000, $10,000, and $1,000,000, respectively). Crime is very inefficient from a social per-
spective (not surprisingly).
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TABLE I
SOCIAL WELFARE AND LARCENY
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(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-60.22 -66.12 -68.32 -60.77 -56.34 -50.63 -58.44
-57.16 -64.04 -66.93 -56.86 -49.35 -44.41 -56.74
-56.51 -63.51 -66.62 -55.18 -46.50 -42.55 -56.54
-56.33 -63.62 -66.84 -55.12 -45.33 -42.03 -56.71
-56.56 -63.95 -67.31 -55.14 -44.85 -41.91 -56.91
-56.63 -64.30 -67.86 -55.15 -44.65 -41.95 -57.06
-56.68 -64.61 -68.40 -55.18 -44.59 -41.98 -57.15
-56.70 -64.87 -68.91 -55.20 -44.55 -42.01 -57.26
-56.72 -65.06 -69.30 -55.22 -44.54 -42.03 -57.28
-56.74 -65.20 -69.75 -55.23 -44.54 -42.05 -57.30
-56.74 -65.53 -70.70 -55.24 -44.55 -42.07 -57.33



















limitations 4 3 3 4 9 5 3
NOTE. - Methodology and sources are described in the text. Each cell presents the value of the social
welfare function (equation (AI» for a given statute of limitations and parameter specification. Column (I):
Base case in which h = $2,000, sentence (t) is 6 months, the probability of ever being caught is .03,
individuals discount the future at approximately a 35 percent annual rate, society discounts the future at a
4 percent rate, and criminals experience disutility from prison of $12,000 per year. Society faces prison
and prosecution costs of approximately $30,000-$40,000 per year, and half of all prisoners that are ever
punished are sent to jail within approximately 10 months. The distributional parameters are chosen so that
approximately 2 percent of the population commits a crime. Column (2): Punishment occurs with a longer
lag (half of all prisoners are punished within 2 years). All other parameters are the same as in the base
case. Column (3): Punishment occurs with an even longer lag (half of all prisoners are punished within 3
years). All other parameters are the same as in the base case. Column (4): Potential criminals are less
impatient (they discount the future at a 25 percent annual rate). All other parameters are the same as in
the base case. Column (5): Potential criminals are patient (they discount the future at a 10 percent annual
rate). All other parameters are the same as in the base case. Column (6): Potential criminals place higher
disutility on prison (prison has a disutility of $20,000). All other parameters are the same as in the base
case. Column (7): The distribution of criminal gains in the population is more dispersed than in the base
case (lower mean and higher variance). All other parameters are the same as in the base case.
absolute values have little meaning. A similar disclaimer applies to com-
parisons of the value of the social welfare function between columns (with
different specifications) or between tables (with different types of crimes).
B. Results of Numerical Simulation
Table 1: Larceny (h = $2,000). Under almost all the specifications used
in the simulation, the statute of limitations for achieving optimal deterrence
for crimes with a harm of $2,000 ranged between 3 and 5 years. (The optimal
statute of limitations is given in the last row of each column.) These figures
are remarkably consistent with the statutes of limitations found in many U.S.
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TABLE 2
SOCIAL WELFARE AND MID-LEVEL CRIMES
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-187 -220.14 -231.1 -174.6 -160.58 -150.39 -179.56
-160.6 -205.8 -218.8 -139.9 -127.26 -129.63 -163
-152.88 -202.7 -216.1 -127.37 -119.92 -119.63 -158.64
-151.9 -197.Q7 -215.3 -122.9 -117.4 -116.78 -158.05
-151.4 -196.6 -216.5 -121.5 -115.86 -116.34 -158.38
-151.3 -198.3 -218.8 -121.3 -115.38 -116.33 -158.81
-152.4 -200.4 -222.2 -121.0 -115.2 -116.28 -159.12
-152.7 -202.5 -225.6 -121.2 -115.14 -116.3 -159.32
-153 -204.2 -228.6 -121.3 -115.07 -116.33 -159.44
-153.1 -205.6 -231.2 -121.4 -115.08 -116.34 -159.5
-153.3 -206.7 -237.7 -121.7 -115.09 -116.35 -159.58



















limitations 6 5 4 7 9 7 4
NOTE.-Methodology and sources are described in the text. Each cell presents the value of the social
welfare function (equation (AI» for a given statute of limitations and parameter specification. Column (I):
Base case in which h = $10,000, sentence (t) is 4 years, the probability of ever being caught is .08,
individuals discount the future at approximately a 35 percent annual rate, society discounts the future at a
4 percent rate, and criminals experience disutility from prison of $12,000 per year. Society faces prison
and prosecution costs of approximately $30,000-$40,000 per year, and half of all prisoners that are ever
punished are sent to jail within approximately 10 months. The distributional parameters are chosen so that
approximately .7% of the population commits a crime. Column (2): Punishment occurs with a longer lag
(half of all prisoners are punished within 2 years). All other parameters are the same as in the base case.
Column (3): Punishment occurs with an even longer lag (half of all prisoners are punished within 3 years).
All other parameters are the same as in the base case. Column (4): Potential criminals are less impatient
(they discount the future at a 25 percent annual rate). All other parameters are the same as in the base case.
Column (5): Potential criminals are patient (they discount the future at a 10 percent annual rate). All other
parameters are the same as in the base case. Column (6): Potential criminals place higher disutility on
prison (prison has a disutility of $20,000). All other parameters are the same as in the base case. Column
(7): The distribution of criminal gains in the population is more dispersed than in the base case (lower
mean and higher variance). All other parameters are the same as in the base case.
states.35 Apparently, U.S. state time bars (chosen to protect the rights of the
criminal) are also relatively efficient.
These findings are robust to many different parameter specifications, such
as changes in the distributional parameters or the disutility associated with
35 See, for geographical examples, Ala. Code § 15-3-1 (2000) (which has a statute of lim-
itations for larceny of 3 years); Alaska Stat. § 12.10.010 (2000) (larceny time bar: 5 years);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-107 (2000) (larceny time bar: 7 years); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-193 (2000)
(larceny time bar: 5 years); Minn. Stat. § 628.26 (2000) (larceny time bar: 3 years); Idaho
Code § 19-402 (2000) (larceny time bar: 3 years); and Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2 (2000) (larceny
time bar: 5 years). The states with no statutes of limitations for felonies, however, seem to
have a decidedly inefficient policy; see Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 9.
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TABLE 3
SOCIAL WELFARE AND HEINOUS CRIMES
111
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-3020 -6993 -7893 -559 -2432 -2152 -827
-1634 -2919 -4349 -338 -1359 -1121 -453
-1299 -2086 -3388 -259 -1050 -876 -360
-1194 -1842 -2913 -229 -960 -830 -331
-1153 -1760 -2680 -217 -918 -803 -321
-1147 -1722 -2557 -213 -909 -794 -317
-1143 -1719 -2491 -212 -905 -791 -316
-1142 -1718 -2456 -212 -903 -790 -315
-1142 -1718 -2438 -212 -902 -790 -315
-1141 -1717 -2424 -212 -902 -789 -315
-1140 -1717 -2423 -212 -901 -789 -315



















limitations IS 15 15 IS 15 IS IS
NOTE. - Methodology and sources are described in the text. Each cell presents the value of the social
welfare function (equation (AI)) for a given statute of limitations and parameter specification. Column (I):
Base case in which h = $1,000,000, sentence (t) is 30 years, the probability of ever being caught is .6,
individuals discount the future at a 35 percent annual rate, society discounts the future at a 4 percent rate,
and criminals experience disutility from prison of $12,000 per year. Society faces prison and prosecution
costs of approximately $30,000-$40,000 per year, and half of all prisoners that are ever punished are sent
to jail within approximately 10 months. The distributional parameters are chosen so that approximately
.1 % of the population commits a crime. Column (2): Punishment occurs with a longer lag (half of all
prisoners are punished within 2 years). All other parameters are the same as in the base case. Column (3):
Punishment occurs with an even longer lag (half of all prisoners are punished within 3 years). All other
parameters are the same as in the base case. Column (4): Potential criminals are less impatient (they discount
the future at a 25 percent annual rate). All other parameters are the same as in the base case. Column (5):
Potential criminals place higher disutility on prison (prison has a disutility of $20,000). All other parameters
are the same as in the base case. Column (6): The distribution of criminal gains in the population is more
dispersed than in the base case (lower mean and higher variance). All other parameters are the same as in
the base case. Column (7): The distribution of criminal gains in the population is less dispersed than in
the base case (higher mean and lower variance). All other parameters are the same as in the base case.
prison (see columns (6) and (7)).36 If potential criminals are relatively patient,
however, the optimal statute of limitations is much longer (see column (5));
since criminals discount the future more slowly in this case, punishments far
in the future maintain some deterrent effect. As a result, punishments after
a long lag are more likely to be efficient when criminals are patient than
when they are impatient.37
36 These findings are also robust to parameter specifications that are not presented in the
table, such as changes in imprisonment costs, social discount rates, and probabilities of pun-
ishment.
37 If white-collar criminals, for example, are believed to be more patient, then this result
would imply that statutes of limitations should be longer for white-collar crimes. Moreover,
if white-collar criminals presumably also have a higher opportunity cost for a year in jail, then
this also mitigates in favor of longer statutes of limitations (see proposition 2B).
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The results suggest that the costs of choosing an overly long statute of
limitations are smaller than those of choosing a statute of limitations that is
too short. This is not surprising. Very short statutes of limitations will sig-
nificantly reduce deterrence and lead to many more crimes. A statute of
limitations of zero, for example, would imply no deterrence. The costs of
such a large increase in crime will be greater than the inefficiencies of
excessively long statutes of limitations. This does not imply that the costs
of excessively long statutes of limitations are irrelevant, however. In column
(1) of Table 1, for example, a statute of limitations of 6 years is approximately
.6 percent more inefficient than the optimal statute of limitations (4 years).
Since the social welfare functions represent the entire costs associated with
a specific type of crime, a difference of .6 percent in social losses as a result
of inefficient statutes of limitations is quite significant.38
Table 2: Mid-Level Crimes (h = $10,000), and Table 3: High-Level
Crimes (h = $1,000,000). The results in these simulations share many of
the features of the first simulation. For example, there is a broadly consistent
range for the statute of limitations (4-8 years in the case of robbery39 and
15-20 years in the case of murder). In addition, the cost of deviating from
the optimal statute of limitations is lower on the high side than on the low
side. As described above, however, this does not imply that the inefficiencies
resulting from overly long statutes of limitations are trivial. Finally, when
criminals are more patient, the optimal statute of limitations rises.
Unlike the case of larceny, the statute of limitations tends to be longer in
these simulations because the value of deterring an additional crime rises (as
described in the comparative statics of the model above). Most U.S. states
seem to follow this general principle by having longer statutes of limitations
for more pernicious crimes. Even for the most nefarious crimes, however,
there comes a point (after approximately 15-20 years) at which punishing
the crime becomes inefficient from a strict deterrence perspective. This result
conflicts with the statutes of all U.S. states, which recognize no statutes of
limitations for crimes such as murder. This suggests that murders punished
long after the fact are punished for reasons other than deterrence.
38 One study suggests that the costs of all types of crime range in the neighborhood of
1 trillion dollars. This (necessarily imprecise) study, however, includes many costs not relevant
to the present analysis, such as private precautions. See David Anderson, The Aggregate Burden
of Crime, 42 J. Law & Econ. 611 (1999).
39 These numbers are generally consistent with the statutes of limitations for robbery in U.S.
states. See, for geographical examples, Ala. Code § 15-3-1 (2000) (which has a statute of
limitations for robbery of 3 years); Alaska Stat. § 12.10.010 (2000) (robbery time bar:
5 years); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-107 (2000) (robbery time bar: 7 years); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 54-193 (2000) (robbery time bar: 5 years); Minn. Stat. § 628.26 (2000) (robbery time bar:
6 years); Idaho Code § 19-402 (2000) (robbery time bar: 5 years); Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2
(2000) (robbery time bar: 5 years).
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IV. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND MONETARY JUDGMENTS
The simulations presented above suggest that crimes that are punished
with imprisonment should optimally have statutes of limitations that accord
with those seen in practice. Since the "driving force" behind this result is
the fact that imprisonment is socially costly, this analysis would not seem
to apply to statutes of limitations on monetarily punishable crimes (which
are not costly to impose). A modification of the model presented here, how-
ever, can be applied to statutes of limitations for monetary fines.
While the payment of a fine is not socially costly, the imposition of a fine
does have costs. Trials require public expenditures. Moreover, the risk of an
"unfairly" imposed fine may have social costs.40 It is also reasonable to
suspect that these costs may be increasing with time (as memories fade and
witnesses become harder to locate). Indeed, these costs are the same as those
emphasized by conventional interpretations of statutes of limitations. Dis-
counting, however, reduces the deterrence value of a fine imposed in the
future in the same way that it reduces the value of a prison sentence. The
present discounted value of a fine paid far in the future is smaller than the
nominal value of the fine today. As a result, a given fine achieves less
deterrence when it is imposed after a longer lag.
Thus, the benefits of a fine (increased deterrence) decrease faster than a
fine's social costs as the lag between crime and punishment increases. These
are exactly the conditions that led to the existence of an optimal statute of
limitations in the model above. One does not need to think that the benefits
of statutes of limitations are immense to justify their existence. Because
statutes of limitations do not reduce deterrence so significantly because of
discounting, even a small benefit (in terms of fairness or the right of repose,
for example) may make time bars worthwhile.
Note that this explanation differs from the standard explanation of statutes
of limitations.41 While the standard explanations emphasize the social costs
described here, they tend to neglect the fact that the deterrence benefits of
punishing crimes are decreasing with the lag between crime and punishment
as a result of discounting. Both an increase in costs and a decrease in benefits
are critical elements that mitigate in favor of statutes of limitations.
This analysis can also be applied (more tenuously) to statutes oflimitations
in civil actions. If the purposes of tort liability are optimal precaution and
compensation for damages, then a given damage award accomplishes in-
creasingly little as time passes. The "real value" of a given nominal tort
40 The punishment of innocents may impose a psychic cost on society, for example. The
probability of inappropriate sanction may well go up as the lag between crime and punishment
increases. Note that these costs would also apply to crimes sanctioned by imprisonment.
4\ See Chavez, supra note 3; Note, supra note I; and Posner, supra note 5, at 587.
HeinOnline -- 31 J. Legal Stud.  114 2002
114 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
award decreases because of discounting.42 As a result, the compensatory value
of the award (to the one who is harmed) is diminished. In addition, dis-
counting erodes the value of damages in ensuring efficient precaution by
potential tortfeasors. Therefore, the benefits of tort awards are decreasing
with time. If one believes that the potential "costs" of tort awards (in the
form of mistaken decisions and the violation of the right of repose) are not
similarly decreasing with the lag between crime and punishment, then statutes
of limitations for civil offenses may be efficient.
V. CONCLUSION
The discussions and simulations above suggest several conclusions re-
garding statutes of limitations. First, it is clear that from an efficiency per-
spective, every crime that society deems worth punishing by imprisonment
should have a statute of limitations on prosecution. Second, the optimal
statutes of limitations depend in crucial ways upon many factors, such as
the harm associated with the crime and the time distribution of punishment.
Finally, most U.S. states seem to have reasonably efficient statutes of limi-
tations--only those states that do not apply statutes of limitations for even
the most minor felonies have laws that are significantly different than those
suggested by the simulations presented here.43
This analysis provides some insight regarding the suspension and extension
of time bars. Extending a statute of limitations generally accomplishes quite
little. As a result, extensions of a statute of limitations may be counterpro-
ductive. For example, the recent trend of extending statute of limitations for
sexual offenses against minors until after the victims reach adulthood may
be wrongheaded.44 No one questions that the crimes are heinous. Neverthe-
less, the threat of additional punishments far off in the future does little to
deter would-be molesters, who heavily discount the additional punishments.
Moreover, the right to a fair trial in these cases has often been compromised,
as memories and evidence are often quite sketchy.45 Finally, in the simulations
presented here, statutes of limitations longer than 15 years are almost never
cost-efficient, even for the most heinous crimes.
42 Of course, if the size of the tort award is increased to take discounting and time lags into
account ("prejudgment interest"), then this analysis no longer applies. Indeed, the prevalence
of prejudgment interest would suggest that statutes of limitations for civil awards should be
approached with greater skepticism. If the "benefits" of tort awards are not decreasing with
time, then the costs of long lags between crime and punishment must be onerous to justify
barring civil suits because of excessive time lags.
43 See Emsdorrf & Loftus, supra note 9.
44 See Durga M. Bharam, Statute of Limitations for Child Sexual Abuse Offenses: A Time
for Reform Using the Discovery Rule, 80 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 842 (1989); and
Josephine Bulkley & Mark Horwitz, Adults Sexually Abused as Children: Legal Actions and
Issues, 12 Behav. Sci. & L. 65 (1994).
45 See Olson, supra note 6; and Emsdorff & Loftus, supra note 9.
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The "continuing conspiracy" doctrine established by a number of court
cases, by contrast, offers an example of a case where the statute of limitations
should be extended ("tolled").46 When overt (but otherwise legal) acts as-
sociated with an earlier conspiracy are committed, they cause harm in addition
to the harm caused by the original conspiracy. As a result, they should be
deterred. Extending the statute of limitations for the original conspiracy is
one way of deterring these later harmful actions, even if the extended statute
of limitations adds little to deterrence of the original crime.
These applications suggest that a proper understanding of statutes of lim-
itations requires a careful consideration of the implications of discounting.
The salience of discounting in studies of both statutes of limitations and
optimal sentence lengths47 suggests that discounting may be a critical and
generally overlooked topic in the analysis of law enforcement. Further ex-
ploration of the implications of discounting for optimal law enforcement is
an important task of future research.
APPENDIX
I. THE BASIC MODEL
The model discussed here considers only crimes punishable by imprisonment
within a strict-liability framework.48 All crimes are assumed to occur at time 0, while
punishment for a crime committed at time °occurs with some probability in any
future time period. A crime cannot be committed and punished in the same instant.
Assume a social welfare function49
u = f: gz(g)dg - [I - Z(g)]
x [h + 7Tf: e-6s p(s)'Atds + 7T in e-6,~sP(S)lXtdS], (AI)
where g = 7T f~e-6s p(s)'Atds.
Each term of this maximization problem will be explained in tum. Note that all
functions are continuous and differentiable by assumption.
The gain g that potential criminals accrue from committing a crime is distributed
through the population with strictly increasing cumulative distribution function
46 See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601 (\910); Brown v. Elliot, 225 U.S. 392 (\912);
and Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (\957).
47 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note II.
48 The model also can be applied to crime punishable by fines, so long as there is a positive
cost of imposing the fine.
49 The term corresponding to law enforcement expenditures,ft7T), is suppressed here, since
law enforcement expenditures are assumed to be exogenous. ThUS,ft7T) will not change relative
social welfare levels.
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(A2)
Z(g) and continuous probability density function z(g).50 The potential losses associated
with committing a crime are given by 7r J~e-6'p(s)"Atds, with the following:
7r E [0, I] is the (exogenous) probability of a crime ever being detected and punished
(equivalently, the probability of a crime ever being punished if there is no statute
of limitations). Note that if a crime is detected before the statute of limitations has
run its course, then the crime is always punished.
p(s) is the (exogenous) probability that a crime committed at time 0 will be punished
in time period s, given that the crime is detected at all. Thus, the total probability
of a crime being punished in period s is 7rp(s). In addition, assume (for technical
reasons) that p(s) > 0 for all s ~ O.
n is the statute of limitations. At a time beyond n, a criminal cannot be punished,
even if the criminal is guilty of a crime. Thus, the total probability of punishment
for a crime is given by 7r J~p(s)ds.
"A is the disutility a criminal receives from spending I year in prison; t is the length
of the sentence, given exogenously here.51 Disutility from prison is thus "At. Note
that this abstracts from discounting of disutility within the prison sentence.52
ois a potential criminal's discount rate, and 0~ O. The present discounted value of
being punished in period s is thus e-6'"At.
Taken together, these points imply that the expected value of punishment to a
criminal committing a crime at time 0 is 7r J~e-6Sp(s)"Atds. This term is finite.
A potential criminal will choose to commit a crime only if the gains from the
crime exceed the expected losses,53 that is, if
g> 7r I: e-6' p(s)"Atds.
If the gains associated with a particular harmful act are distributed through the
p~pulation,.then thi~ implies the existence ~~ a mar~inal criminal_with g,~ins associated
With the come of g (often called the "cohcal gam"), where g = 7r Joe-6' p(s)"Atds.
All individuals with gains from the harmful act above g will commit the act; indi-
viduals with gains below g will refrain.
Thus, the first term of equation (AI), Jigz(g)dg, represents the gains that accrue
to criminals from the crimes that are committed.
The next series of terms,
[1- Z(g)] [h + 7r I: e-6'p(s)"Atds + 7r I: e-6'OC S p(S)atds],
constitutes the harm imposed on society by a crime. The term [l - Z(g)] is the pro-
portion of the population that commits a crime. For each of these crimes, there is a
harm, h, that is imposed on society. In addition, there are punishment costs of
50 The gain g might be distributed through the population because of many different factors,
such as differential psychological costs of crime or differential real benefits from crime. Note
that g can be negative for some individuals. Note also that g ranges to infinity. As a result,
complete deterrence is not possible since no punishment can cause infinite disutility.
5\ Allowing A or t to vary does not change the fundamental results of the model-a finite
statute of limitations will still be optimal.
52 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 11.
53 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An EconOinic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ.
169 (\968).
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(A3)
1r J~e-o,o,s p(s)extds, where osoc is society's discount rate and ex is the cost of prison
for 1 year. (Again, this abstracts from discounting within the prison sentence.) Finally,
1r J~e-os p(s)"Atds is the deadweight loss that results from incarcerating an inmate
(from "wasted" time while the criminal is in jail).
Two assumptions are also required.
ASSUMPTION 1. z(O)"Ah > "A + ex. This assumption simply implies that expanding
the statute of limitations from zero to some finite amount is worthwhile. (In other
words, it implies that the crime is worth punishing at all.)54
ASSUMPTION 2. 0> osoC" This implies that criminals are less patient than society.
II. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
PROPOSITION 1. All crimes that are punished should have a finite statute of
limitations.
Proof Apply Leibniz's rule repeatedly to equation (AI), obtaining the first
derivative, aUlan:
::: z(i)1re-o• p(n)"At[h + 1r Jo' e-os p(s)"Atds + 1r10' e-o,ocsp(s)extds - g]
- [1 - Z(j)][1re-o, p(n)"At + 1re-o,oc' p(n)ext]
::: z(i)1re-o• p(n)"A+ + 1r Jo' e-o,ocsP(s)extdS]
From assumption 1, equation (A3) is positive when n ::: 0.55 As n gets large,
however, the terms e-o, and e-o,o,' get arbitrarily close to zero. Since 0> osoO' the
term multiplied by e-o,o,' approaches zero at a slower rate than the terms multiplied
by e-o, (recall that all terms in this expression are finite). Thus, for large values of
n, the term - [1 - Z(i)] 1re-o,oc' p(n)ext, which is negative (since Z(g) "* 1), dominates
the other terms, and aU/an < 0 as n gets very large. Since this expression is continuous
and is greater than zero at n ::: 0 and less than zero for very large values of n, this
implies that neither n ::: 0 nor very large values of n can be global maxima, as raising
n from n ::: 0 raises social welfare while lowering n from very large values of n
also raises welfare. Thus, there must be a finite statute of limitations, n, for which
54 A less restrictive assumption would state that even if it were not optimal to have a very
short statute of limitations as opposed to none at all, there is some statute of limitations that
entails greater social welfare than having a statute of limitations of zero--in formal terms, that
f gz(g)dg - [I - Z(g)] (h + 1rJ: e-O'p(s)Nds + 1rJ: e-o..,.p(S)atds)
> [gZ(g)dg - [I - Z(O)]h
for some n.
55 Alternatively, one could simply assume that the total (and hence the marginal) net benefits
of lengthening the statute of limitations are positive for some n. The proof follows with the
first such n replacing n = O.
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aUlan = 0 and therefore social welfare is maximized.56 This statute of limitations is
defined implicitly as the maximum of the point(s) at which aUlan = 0.57 Another
way of understanding the proof is to note that since 0> o,oc' any term multiplied by
e-h converges to zero faster than any term multiplied by e-o,o<,. Therefore, the term
multiplied by e-o,oc' can be larger than all the other terms of the equation by any
arbitrary factor. Since the term multiplied by e-o""" enters negatively, this implies
that as n gets very large, aUlan < O.
. PROPOSITION 2A. an/ah > O.
Proof First, note that because the statute of limitations is set at a maximum
(proposition I), a2 U1an 2 < 0 in the neighborhood around the maximum point. Using
the implicit function theorem, an/ah = - (a 2U1iJn ah)/ (a 2 U1an 2 ). From the first-
order condition a2U1an ah = z(i)71'e-on p(n)"Al > O. Thus, on/ah > O.
PROPOSITION 2B. an/ao < O.
Assume that
-ne-on"Al{[Z<i>[h + 71'f e-o,o<,p(s)rxlds + Z(i)] - I}
- 71'I: se-o,P(S)"Alds{Z<i>e-on + Z'(i)[h + 71'I: e-o,o<,P(S)rxldS]} < O.
Since the optimal statute of limitations occurs at a maximum, a2U1an 2 < O. Thus, by
the implicit function theorem and our assumption,
PROPOSITION 2C.
Assume that
an/aO = (-a 2u/an aO)/(a 2U1an 2 ) < O.
an/a"A>o.
Since the optimal statute of limitations occurs at a maximum, a2U1an 2 < O. Thus,
by the implicit function theorem and our assumption,
an/a "A = (-a 2u/an a"A)/(a 2U1an 2» O.
56 There can, of course, be more than one critical point of this first-order condition. One of
the critical points, however, must be a global maximum since social welfare does not attain a
maximum when n is either 0 or 00.
57 If other variables, such as sentence length (1) or enforcement effort (71") are endogenous
rather than exogenous, proposition I remains valid. The basics of the proof remain the same.
Social welfare does not attain a maximum when the statute of limitations (n) is either 0 or
00 for all finite values of sentence length or enforcement effort, which thus implies that there
must be an interior maximum (and thus a finite statute of limitations).
